| Summary |
Chih-Yin Wang, 2008.07
Department of Transportation Technology and Management National Chiao Tung University
The supply chain structure varies due to technical innovations, behavioral changes of customers and etc. A dominant retailer is an outcome of these changes. Supply chain-related game theoretical applications have been discussed for decades, and this research is focus on the pricing game applications. This research accounts for the emergence of a dominant retailer, and the retailer Stackelberg pricing models of distribution channels.
We discuss the effects when the channel members choose absolute price, absolute margin and percentage margin in the retailer Stackelberg pricing game. We also transform the retailer Stackelberg pricing game to a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) problem, and include the wholesale price competition (manufacturers’ price competition) into the model.
The results show the outcomes are not relative to manufacturers’ pricing decisions but to the retailer’s pricing decision. And the retailer will choose only absolute retail margin and percentage retail margin as pricing decision variables. |
