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Trans. Planning Journal
| Title | A Bargaining Model for Concession Period and Royalty for Transportation BOT Projects |
|---|---|
| Author | Chao-Chung Kang, Cheng-Min Feng and Shin-Ning Wang |
| Summary | The royalty and concession period of contract are important negotiation issues in BOT concession contract. However, issues of royalty and concession period do not have a reasonable standard to follow at present, and the both issues of royalty and concession period negotiation model have seldom been explored in the past studies. So this study established the bargaining model for concession period and royalty issues through the Rubinstein bargaining game theory for transportation BOT projects, which is different from the past single-issue bargaining model. The bargaining model includes discount factor, bargaining cost, negotiation ability, negotiation starting value, the number of negotiation and the number of negotiation restrictions. Through the model of this study, both the government and the optimal applicant can determinate the most appropriate outcome of the negotiations after weighing each issue, and they can also find the optimal agreement solution of their own largest reward and the worst solution of their smallest reward. In addition, the resulting model enabled a better understanding of the BOT concession negotiation process. Moreover, the study can provide a BOT negotiation strategy for both decision- makers and administrative department with some BOT policy amendments. |
| Vol. | 42 |
| No. | 3 |
| Page | 247 |
| Year | 2013 |
| Month | 9 |
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